Merely some places (US and EU) enjoy economic prosperity, whereas others fall into valleys. Secondly, as opposed to the belief of “investment knows no boundaries”, the statistics indicated the globalization’s future would be less optimistic than Friedman expected. Ghernawat (2007, p58) raised a “10% presumption” in a report that focuses on capital investment around the globe. “10% presumption” is a research aimed to find out whether 10 per cent of all the capital being invested around the world is conducted by companies outside home countries. Penn State Nittany Lions In fact, the findings overthrew the thesis of “world integration”. The total amount of the world’s capital formation generated from foreign direct investment (FDI) was not even close to 10%. In this matter, over 90% of capital earnings around the world are still from local investments. The reason behind this domestic-oriented investment was a strong sense of national defense. To some extent, Friedman has brought about an As a result of globalization, inequality was created among communities.
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Refer to Friedman’s article; he applied his experience in Infosys as a notion to “flat world”. Nevertheless, Indian is where US firm outsourced employees for the purpose of lower labor costs, along with political and geographic constraints imposed on these foreign programmers who are unable to beexempt from origin of employers’ country. Penn State Nittany Lions Thirdly, the event of Berlin Wall’s On a modern-day passage to India, Thomas L. Friedman, the foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, found himself chatting in Bangalore with a young, slight, mustachioed videogame-company CEO named Rajesh Rao. “India is going to be a superpower,” Rao said, gushing about a new economic era that makes the globe into one massive marketplace, “and we are going to rule.” But rule whom? Friedman asked. Rao laughed. “It’s not about ruling anybody,” he admitted. “That’s the point. There is nobody to rule anymore.” Rao’s enthusiasm about the changing rules of international commerce and politics today — about whether there’s anything left to rule in a brave new world of globalization — underscores the virtues and vices of Friedman’s.
Where to get it?
In The World Is Flat, Friedman rejoins the debate over what’s really driving world politics, but he does not come out where readers of his eloquent columns on the challenges of defeating bin Ladenism might expect; instead, he argues that “the most important force shaping global economics and politics in the early twenty-first century” is not the admittedly important war on terrorism but a “triple convergence — of new players, on a new playing field, developing new processes and habits for horizontal collaboration.” Penn State Nittany Lions Friedman writes that the world is now entering the era of “Globalization 3.0,” following Globalization 1.0, which ran from 1492 until 1800 and was driven by countries’ sheer brawn, and Globalization 2.0, in which “the key agent of change, the dynamic force driving global integration, was multinational companies” driven to look abroad for markets and labor, spurred by industrial-age “breakthroughs in hardware” such as steamships, trains, phones and computers. That epoch ended around 2000, replaced by one in which individuals are the main agents doing the globalizing, pushed by “not horsepower, and not hardware, but software” and a “global fiber-optic network that has made us all next-door neighbors.” If the first two eras were driven mostly by Europeans and Americans, the third is open to “every color of the human rainbow.” In particular, Friedman is obsessed with one of the sun.